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Abstract—Order-preserving encryption allows encrypting data,
while still enabling efficient range queries on the encrypted
data. Moreover, it does not require any change to the database
management system, because comparison operates on ciphertexts
as on plaintexts. This makes order-preserving encryption schemes
very suitable for data outsourcing in cloud computing scenarios.
However, all order-preserving encryption schemes are necessarily
symmetric limiting the use case to one client and one server.
Imagine a scenario where a Data Owner encrypts its data
before outsourcing it to the Cloud Service Provider and a Data
Analyst wants to execute private range queries on this data.
This scenario occurs in many cases of collaborative machine
learning where data source and processor are different entities.
Then either the Data Owner must reveal its encryption key
or the Data Analyst must reveal the private queries. In this
paper, we overcome this limitation by allowing the equivalent of
a public-key order-preserving encryption. We present a secure
multiparty protocol that enables secure range queries for multiple
users. In this scheme, the Data Analyst cooperates with the
Data Owner and the Cloud Service Provider in order to order-
preserving encrypt the private range queries without revealing
any other information to the parties. The basic idea of our
scheme is to replace encryption with a secure, interactive pro-
tocol. In this protocol, we combine order-preserving encryption
based on binary search trees with homomorphic encryption and
garbled circuits achieving security against passive adversaries
with sublinear communication and computation complexity. We
apply our construction to different order-preserving encryption
schemes including frequency-hiding order-preserving encryption
which can withstand many of the popularized attacks on order-
preserving encryption. We implemented our scheme and observed
that if the database size of the Data Owner has 1 million entries
it takes only about 0.3 s on average via a loopback interface (1.3
s via a LAN) to encrypt an input of the Data Analyst.
I. INTRODUCTION
In cloud computing, companies use a network of remote
servers hosted by a service provider on the Internet to store,
manage, and process data, rather than a local server or a
personal computer. Naively this would imply that Data Owners
must give up either the security of the data or the functionality
of processing the data. Therefore companies are reluctant to
migrate their sensitive data to the cloud. However, different
techniques, such as secure multiparty computation [8], [16],
[24], [27], [33], [38], homomorphic encryption [9], [15], [31]
or order-preserving encryption [1], [5], [6], [19], [20], [34],
[35], exist that enable cloud users to encrypt their data before
outsourcing it to the cloud while still be able to process
and search on the outsourced and encrypted data without
decrypting it. Order-preserving encryption (OPE) allows en-
crypting data, while still enabling efficient range queries on
the encrypted data. Moreover it does not require any change
to the database management system, because comparison op-
erates on ciphertexts. This makes order-preserving encryption
schemes very suitable for data outsourcing in cloud computing
scenarios, since it can be retrofitted to existing applications.
However, all OPE schemes are necessarily symmetric limit-
ing the use case to one client and one server. This is due to the
fact that a public-key encryption would allow a binary search
on the ciphertext. Imagine a scenario where a Data Owner
(DO) encrypts its data before outsourcing it to the Cloud
Service Provider (CSP) and a Data Analyst (DA) wants to
execute private range queries on this data. Then either the Data
Owner must reveal its encryption key, since order-preserving
encryption is symmetric, or the Data Analyst must reveal the
private queries.
This distinction between DO and DA occurs in many
cases of collaborative data analysis, data mining and machine
learning. In such scenarios, multiple parties need to jointly
conduct data analysis tasks based on their private inputs. As
concrete examples from the literature consider, e.g., supply
chain management, collaborative forecasting, benchmarking,
criminal investigation, smart metering, etc.) [2], [3], [11],
[18]. Although in these scenarios plaintext information sharing
would be a viable alternative, participants are reluctant to
share their information with others. This reluctance is quite
rational and commonly observed in practice. It is due to the
fact that the implications of the information are unknown or
hard to assess. For example, sharing the information could
weaken their negotiation position, impact customers’ market
information by revealing corporate performance and strategies
or impact reputation [2], [3], [7].
In this paper, we overcome the limitation of private range
querying on order-preserving encrypted data by allowing the
equivalent of a public-key encryption. Our idea is to replace
public-key encryption with a secure, interactive protocol. Non-
interactive binary search on the ciphertext is no longer feasible,
since every encryption requires the participation of the Data
Owner who can rate limit (i.e., control the rate of query sent
by) the Data Analyst.
Since neither the DA wants to reveal his query value nor
the DO his encryption state (key), this is clearly an instance of
a secure computation where two or more parties compute on
their secret inputs without revealing anything but the result.
In an ideal world the DA and DO would perform a two-party
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secure computation for the encryption of the query value and
then the DA would send the encrypted value as part of an SQL
query to the CSP. However, this two-party secure computation
is necessarily linear in the encryption state (key) and hence the
size of the database. Our key insight of this paper is that we
can construct an encryption with logarithmic complexity in
the size of the database by involving the CSP in a three-party
secure computation without sacrificing any security, since the
CSP will learn the encrypted query value in any case. One
may conjecture that in this construction the encryption key
of the DO may be outsourced to secure hardware in the CSP
simplifying the protocol to two parties, but that would prevent
the DO from rate limiting the encryption and the binary search
attack would be a threat again, even if the protocol were
otherwise secure.
We call our protocol oblivious order-preserving encryption.
We implemented it and an encryption by the DA takes 0.3
seconds using the loopback interface and 1.3 seconds using a
LAN in a large data center.
Our contributions are as follows:
• First, we introduce a novel notion of oblivious order-
preserving encryption. This scheme allows a DA to
execute private range queries on an order-preserving
encrypted database.
• Then, we propose an oblivious order-preserving encryp-
tion protocol based on mutable order-preserving encryp-
tion schemes by Popa et al. [34] and Kerschbaum and
Schro¨pfer [20].
• Since the schemes [20], [34] are deterministic, we also
consider the case where the underlying OPE scheme is
the frequency-hiding OPE of [19], which is probabilistic.
• Finally, we implement and evaluate our scheme.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We review
related work in Section II and preliminaries in Section III
before defining correctness and security of oblivious OPE in
Section IV. Section V describes our scheme for the case where
the underlying OPE scheme is deterministic and prove its
correctness and security. In Section VI we discuss integer
comparison and equality test with garbled circuit and how
we use it in our schemes. The non-deterministic case is
handled in Section VII. We discuss implementations details
and evaluation in Section VIII before concluding our work in
Section IX.
II. RELATED WORK
Order-preserving encryption can be classified into stateless
schemes (see Section II-A) and stateful schemes (see Sec-
tion II-B). Our work is concerned with stateful schemes and
hence we introduce some of their algorithms in this section.
However, we review stateless schemes and their security
definitions first in order to distinguish them from stateful
schemes.
A. Stateless Order-preserving Encryption
Order-preserving encryption ensures that the order relation
of the ciphertexts is the same as the order of the corresponding
plaintexts. This allows to efficiently search on the ciphertexts
using binary search or perform range queries without decrypt-
ing the ciphertexts. The concept of order-preserving encryption
was introduced in the database community by Agrawal et
al. [1]. The cryptographic study of Agrawal et al.’s scheme
was first initiated by [5], which proposed an ideal security
definition IND-OCPA1 for OPE. The authors proved that
under certain implicit assumptions IND-OCPA is infeasible
to achieve. Their proposed scheme was first implemented in
the CryptDB tool of Popa et al. [35] and attacked by Naveed
et al. [30]. In [6] Boldyreva et al. further improved the security
and introduced modular order-preserving encryption (MOPE).
MOPE adds a secret modular offset to each plaintext value
before it is encrypted. It improves the security of OPE, as it
does not leak any information about plaintext location, but
still does not provide ideal IND-OCPA security. Moreover
Mavroforakis et al. showed that executing range queries via
MOPE in a naive way allows the adversary to learn the
secret offset and so negating any potential security gains.
They address this vulnerability by introducing query execution
algorithms for MOPE [29]. However, this algorithm assumes
a uniform distribution of data and has already been attacked in
[12]. In a different strand of work Teranishi et al. improve the
security of stateless order-preserving encryption by randomly
introducing larger gaps in the ciphertexts [37]. However, they
necessarily also fail at providing ideal security.
B. Stateful Order-preserving Encryption
Popa et al. were the first to observe that one can avoid
the impossibility result of [5] by giving up certain restric-
tions of OPE. As result of their observations they introduced
mutable OPE [34]. Their first observation was that most OPE
applications only require a less restrictive interface than that of
encryption schemes. Their encryption scheme is therefore im-
plemented as an interactive protocol running between a client
that also owns the data to be encrypted and an honest-but-
curious server that stores the data. Moreover, it is acceptable
that a small number of ciphertexts of already-encrypted values
change over time as new plaintexts are encrypted. With this
relaxed definition their scheme was the first OPE scheme to
achieve ideal security.
Popa et al.’s scheme (mOPE1) [34]. The basic idea of
Popa et al.’s scheme is to have the encoded values organized
at the server in a binary search tree (OPE-tree). Specifically
the server stores the state of the encryption scheme in a table
(OPE-table). The state contains ciphertexts consisting of a
deterministic AES ciphertext and the order (OPE Encoding)
of the corresponding plaintext. To encrypt a new value x
the server reconstructs the OPE-tree from the OPE-table and
traverses it. In each step of the traversal the client receives the
current node v of the search tree, decrypts and compares it
with x. If x is smaller (resp. larger) then the client recursively
proceeds with the left (resp. right) child node of v. An edge to
1IND-OCPA means indistinguishability under ordered chosen plaintext
attacks and requires that OPE schemes must reveal no additional information
about the plaintext values besides their order
the left (resp. to the right) is encoded as 0 (resp. 1). The OPE
encoding of x is then the path from the root of the tree to x
padded with 10 . . . 0 to the same length l. To ensure that the
length of OPE encoding do not exceed the defined length l, the
server must occasionally perform balancing operations. This
updates some order in the OPE table (i.e. the OPE encoding of
some already encrypted values mutate to another encoding).
Kerschbaum and Schro¨pfer’s scheme (mOPE2) [20]. The
insertion cost of Popa et al’s scheme is high, because the tree
traversal must be interactive between the client and the server.
To tackle this problem Kerschbaum and Schro¨pfer proposed in
[20] another ideal secure, but significantly more efficient, OPE
scheme. Both schemes use binary search and are mutable, but
the main difference is that in the scheme of [20] the state is
not stored on the server but on the client. Moreover the client
chooses a range {0, . . . ,M} for the order. For each plaintext
x and the corresponding OPE encoding y ∈ {0, . . . ,M} the
client maintains a pair 〈x, y〉 in the state. To insert a new
plaintext the client finds two pairs 〈xi, yi〉, 〈xi+1, yi+1〉 in the
state such that xi ≤ x < xi+1 and computes the OPE encoding
as follows:
• if xi = x then the OPE encoding of x is y = yi
• else
– if yi+1 − yi = 1 then
∗ update the state (Algorithm 2 in [20])2.
– the OPE encoding of x is y = yi + dyi+1−yi2 e.
The encryption algorithm is keyless and the only secret
information is the state which grows with the number of
encryptions of distinct plaintexts. The client uses a dictionary
to keep the state small and hence does not need to store a
copy of the data.
Kerschbaum’s scheme (mOPE3) [19]. Deterministic OPE
schemes [1], [5], [20], [34], [37] are vulnerable to many
attacks like: frequency analysis, sorting attack, cumulative
attack [17], [30]. To increase the security of OPE Kerschbaum
first introduced in [19] a new security definition called in-
distinguishability under frequency-analyzing ordered chosen
plaintext attack (IND-FAOCPA) that is strictly stronger than
IND-OCPA. Second he proposed a novel OPE scheme mOPE3
that is secure under this new security definition. The basic
idea of this scheme is to randomize ciphertexts such that
no frequency information from repeated ciphertexts leaks. It
borrows the ideas of [20] with a modification that re-encrypts
the same plaintext with a different ciphertext. First client and
server state are as by mOPE2. The order ranges from 0 to M
as by mOPE2. The algorithm traverses the OPE-tree by going
to the left or to the right depending on the comparison between
the new plaintext and nodes of the tree. However, if the value
being encrypted is equal to some value in the tree then the
algorithm traverses the tree depending on the outcome of a
random coin. Finally, if there is no more node to traverse the
algorithm rebalances the tree if necessary and then computes
the ciphertext similarly to y = yi + dyi+1−yi2 e.
2This potentially updates all OPE encoding y produced so far [20].
In subsequent independent analysis [17] this encryption
scheme has been shown to be significantly more secure to
the attacks against order-preserving encryption (albeit not
perfectly secure).
III. PRELIMINARIES
A. Problem Statement
Figure 1: Illustration of the Problem: DO sends encrypted
data to CSP and retains encryption keys. DA holds a private
decision tree that can be represented as set of range queries.
DA wants to perform data analysis on DO’s encrypted data
without revealing any information on the queries. DO wants
to maintain privacy of the data stored at CSP.
Our work is motivated by the following scenario. Assume
a Data Owner encrypts its data with an order-preserving
encryption, stores the encrypted data in a cloud database held
by a Cloud Service Provider, and retains the encryption key. A
Data Analyst wants to perform some analysis on the encrypted
data. To this end it holds, e.g., a private machine learning
model involving comparisons. In a supply chain scenario, the
Data Analyst could be a supplier (manufacturer) wanting to
optimize its manufacturing process based on data owned by
its buyer (another supplier or distributor).
For instance, we assume the model to be a decision tree
as pictured in Figure 1, where the xi are the thresholds and
(X1, X2, X3) is the input vector (that maps to corresponding
columns in the Data Owner’s database) to be classified. In
order to use the model for classification the Data Analyst
transforms the decision tree into range queries, e.g., for class
c1 we have the query (X1 < x1)∧ (X2 < x2). More precisely
the Data Analyst wants to execute queries like in equations 1
and 2, where we assume X0 to be public.
SELECT COUNT(∗) WHERE X1 < x1 AND X2 < x2 (1)
SELECT X0 WHERE X1 < x1 AND X2 < x2 (2)
However, as the database is encrypted (i.e. columns X1, X2
and X3 are OPE encrypted) the Data Analyst needs ciphertexts
of the thresholds xi. In [36], Taigel et. al. describes an
approach that combines decision tree classification and OPE to
enable privacy-preserving forecasting of maintenance demand
based on distributed condition data. They consider the problem
of a Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul (MRO) provider from
the aerospace industry that provides maintenance services to
their customers’ (e.g., commercial airlines or air forces) jet
engines. The customers as Data Owners consider the real
condition data of their airliners as very sensitive and therefore
this data is stored encrypted in a cloud database using OPE.
The MRO provider as Data Analyst holds a decision tree
that can predict the probability of maintenance, repair, and
overhaul of spare parts. However, the classification of an
individual spare part is not necessary, but only aggregated
numbers such as returned by Equation 1. The aggregated
numbers then allow the MRO to compute the forecast without
violating the privacy of the real condition data. In [36], they
provide privacy only for the customer, while we want to allow
privacy for both customer and MRO provider.
Order-preserving encryption is necessarily symmetric, thus
only the Data Owner can encrypt and decrypt the data stored
on the cloud server. If the Data Analyst needs to obtain a
ciphertext for a query, it can just send the plaintext threshold
to the Data Owner. However, if the model contains intellectual
property which the Data Analyst wants to remain protected,
then this free sharing of information is no longer possible. Our
goal is to allow the data analysis to be performed efficiently
without revealing any sensitive information in the query and
without revealing the key to the order-preserving encryption.
We now review a few building blocks used in our construc-
tion of oblivious order-preserving encryption.
B. Secure Multiparty Computation
Secure multiparty computation (SMC) is a cryptographic
technique that allows several parties to compute a function on
their private inputs without revealing any information other
than the function’s output. A classical example in the literature
is the so called Yao’s millionaire’s problem introduced in
[38]. Two millionaires are interested in knowing which of
them is richer without revealing their actual wealth. Formally
we have a set of n parties P1, . . . , Pn, each with its own
private input x1, . . . , xn and they want to compute the function
y = f(x1, . . . , xn)
3 without disclosing their private inputs.
Security of SMC protocols is often defined by comparison to
an ideal model. In that model parties privately send their input
to a trusted third party (TTP). Then the TTP computes the out-
come of the function on their behalf, sends the corresponding
result to each party and forgets about the private inputs. In
the real model parties emulate the ideal model by executing
a cryptographic protocol to perform the computation. At the
end only the result should be revealed and nothing else. A
SMC protocol is then said to be secure if the adversary can
learn only the result of the computation and data that can be
deduced from this result and known inputs [8], [14], [16].
An important issue to consider when defining the security
of SMC is the adversary’s power. There exists many security
models, but the semi-honest and the malicious adversary model
are the most popular [8], [16]. In the semi-honest (a.k.a
honest-but-curious) model parties behave passively and follow
the protocol specification. However, the adversary can obtain
3The output of each party can also be private, in this case y =
(y1, . . . , yn).
the internal state of corrupted parties and uses this to learn
more information. In contrast, a malicious adversary is active
and instructs corrupted parties to deviate from the protocol
specification.
C. Yao’s Garbled Circuit
Yao’s initial protocol for secure two-party computation uses
a technique called Garbled Circuits (GC). A GC can be used
to execute a function over symmetrically encrypted inputs. In
this section, we recall the idea of GC protocol and refer to
[4], [13], [26], [27], [33], [38] for more technical description
of circuit garbling and its implementation. Let f be a function
over two inputs x and y, then a garbling scheme consists of
a five-tuple of algorithms G = (Gb,En,De,Ev, ev). The
original function f is encoded as circuit that the function
ev(f, ·, ·) : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m can evaluate. On
input f and security parameter k ∈ N, algorithm Gb returns
a triple of strings (F, e, d) ← Gb(1k, f). The string F
describes a garbled function, Ev(F, ·, ·), that maps each pair of
garbled inputs (X,Y ) to a garbled output Z = Ev(F,X, Y ).
The string e describes an encoding function, En(e, ·), that
maps initial inputs x, y ∈ {0, 1}n to garbled inputs X =
En(e, x), Y = En(e, y). The String d describes a decoding
function, De(d, ·), that maps a garbled output Z to a final
output z = De(d, Z). The garbling scheme is correct if
De(d,Ev(F,En(e, x), En(e, y))) = ev(f, x, y) [4].
A GC protocol is a 2-party protocol consisting of a generator
(Gen) and an evaluator (Eva) with input x and y respectively.
On input f and k, Gen runs (F, e, d)← Gb(1k, f) and parses
e as (X01 , X
1
1 , · · · , X0n, X1n, Y 01 , Y 11 , · · · , Y 0n , Y 1n ). Then she
sends F, d and X = (Xx11 , · · · , Xxnn ) ← En(e,X) to Eva,
where xi represents the i-th bit of x. Now the parties execute
an oblivious transfer protocol with Eva having selection string
y and Gen having inputs (Y 01 , Y
1
1 , · · · , Y 0n , Y 1n ). As a result,
Eva obtains Y = (Y y11 , · · · , Y ynn ) and Gen learns nothing.
Finally, Eva evaluates and outputs z = De(d,Ev(F,X, Y )).
D. Homomorphic Encryption
A homomorphic encryption scheme is an encryption scheme
that allows computations on ciphertexts by generating an
encrypted result whose decryption matches the result of opera-
tions on the corresponding plaintexts. With fully homomorphic
encryption schemes [15] one can compute any efficiently
computable function. However, with the current state of the
art, their computational overhead is still too high for practical
applications. Efficient alternatives are additive homomorphic
encryption schemes, e.g.: Paillier [9], [31]. They allow specific
arithmetic operations on plaintexts, by applying an efficient
operation on the ciphertexts. Let E(x) denote the probabilistic
encryption of a plaintext x. Then the following addition
property holds E(x)E(y) = E(x+y), i.e., by multiplying two
ciphertexts one obtains a ciphertext of the sum. In our protocol
we will use the public-key encryption scheme of Paillier [31].
E. Overview of Our Construction
In theory generic SMC allows to compute any efficiently
computable function. However, any generic SMC is at least
linear in the input size, which in this case is the number of
encrypted values in the database. The idea of our solution
is to exploit the inherent, i.e. implied by input and output,
leakage of Popa et. al.’s OPE scheme making our oblivious
OPE sublinear in the database size. Furthermore, we exploit
the advantage of (homomorphic) encryption allowing a unique,
persistent OPE state stored at the CSP while being able
to generate secure inputs for the SMC protocol and the
advantage of garbled circuits allowing efficient, yet provably
secure comparison. Our oblivious order-preserving encryption
is therefore a mixed-technique, secure multi-party computation
protocol between the Data Owner, the Data Analyst and the
Cloud Service Provider in the semi-honest model.
In detail, our protocol proceeds as follows: The Data
Owner outsources its OPE state to the cloud-service provider.
As already described, the state consists of an OPE-table of
ciphertext, order pairs. However, in oblivious order-preserving
encryption the ciphertext is created using an additively ho-
momorphic public-key encryption scheme instead of standard
symmetric encryption. When the DA traverses the state in
order to encrypt a query plaintext, the CSP creates secret
shares4 using the homomorphic property. One secret share
is sent to the DA and one to the DO. The DA and DO
then engage in a secure two-party computation using Yao’s
Garbled Circuits in order to compare the reconstruction of
the secret shares (done in the garbled circuit) to the query
plaintext of the DA. The result of this comparison is again
secret shared between DA and DO, i.e., neither will know
whether the query plaintext is above or below the current node
in the traversal. Both parties – DA and DO – send their secret
shares of the comparison result to the CSP which then can
determine the next node in the traversal. These steps continue
until the query plaintext has been sorted into the OPE-table
and the CSP has an order-preserving encoding that can be
sent to the DA. A significant complication arises from this
order-preserving encoding, since it must not reveal the result
of the comparison protocols to the DA (although it may be
correlated to the results). In the next two sections we provide
the detailed, step-by-step formalization of the construction.
IV. CORRECTNESS AND SECURITY DEFINITIONS
In this section we first present the system architecture
and then define correctness and security of oblivious order-
preserving encryption.
A. System Architecture
Our oblivious OPE (OOPE) protocol ΠOOPE extends the
two-party protocols by Popa et al.’s [34] and by Kerschbaum
and Schro¨pfer [20] to a three-party protocol.
The first party, a.k.a Data Owner (DO), encrypts its data
with an order-preserving encryption as described in Section
II-B and stores the encrypted data in a cloud database hosted
by the second party, Cloud Service Provider (CSP). The third
party, Data Analyst (DA), needs to execute analytic range
4Secret shares are random values that add up to the plaintext.
queries, e.g. how many values are in a given range, on the
Data Owner’s encrypted data. However, the DO’s data is
encrypted with a symmetric key OPE and the DA’s queries
contain sensitive information. Therefore, the DA interacts with
the DO and the CSP to order-preserving encrypt the sensitive
queries values without learning anything else or revealing any
information on the sensitive queries values.
B. Definitions
Let D = {x1, . . . , xn} be the finite data set of the DO,
and h = log2 n. Let [[x]] denote the ciphertext of x under
Paillier’s scheme with public key pk and corresponding private
key sk that only the DO knows. Let  be the order relation on
[[D]] = {[[x1]], . . . , [[xn]]} defined as: [[x1]]  [[x2]] if and only if
x1 ≤ x2. The relations ,≺, are defined the same way with
≥, <,> respectively. Let P = {0, . . . , 2l − 1} (e.g. l = 32)
and O = {0, . . . ,M} (M positive integer) be plaintext and
order5 range resp., i.e.: D ⊆ P.
We begin by defining order-preserving encryption as used
in this paper.
Definition IV.1. Let λ be the security parameter of the public-
key scheme of Paillier. An order-preserving encryption (OPE)
consists of the three following algorithms:
• (pk, sk)← KEYGEN(λ): Generates a public key pk and
a private key sk according to λ,
• S′, 〈[[x]], y〉 ← ENCRYPTOPE(S, x, pk): For a plain x ∈ P
computes ciphertext 〈[[x]], y〉 and updates the state S
to S′, where [[x]] ← PAILLIER.ENCRYPT(x, pk) is a
Paillier ciphertext, y ← mOPE2.ENCRYPT(S, x) (resp.
y ←mOPE3.ENCRYPT(S, x)) is the order of x in the
deterministic (resp. non-deterministic) case with y ∈ O.
• x ← DECRYPTOPE(〈[[x]], y〉 , sk): Computes the plain-
text x ← PAILLIER.DECRYPT([[x]], sk) of the ciphertext
〈[[x]], y〉.
The encryption scheme is correct if:
DECRYPTOPE(ENCRYPTOPE(S, x, pk), sk) = x
for any valid state S and x. It is order-preserving if the order
is preserved, i.e. yi < yj ⇒ xi ≤ xj for any i and j.
For a data set D the encryption scheme generates an
ordered set of ciphertexts. We formalize it with the following
definition.
Definition IV.2. Let j1, j2, . . . be the ordering of D (i.e xj1 ≤
xj2 ≤ . . .) then the OPE scheme generates an OPE-Table
which is an ordered set T = 〈[[xj1 ]], yj1〉 , 〈[[xj2 ]], yj2〉 , . . .,
where yjk ∈ O is the order of xjk .
The OPE-table is sent to the server and used to generate
the following search tree during the oblivious order-preserving
encryption protocol.
Definition IV.3. An OPE-tree is a tree T = (r,L,R), where
r = [[x]] for some x, L and R are OPE-trees such that: If r′
5We will use order and OPE encoding interchangeably.
[[32]]
[[20]]
[[10]]
0
[[25]]
1
0
[[69]]
1
(a) OPE-tree T
[[x]] y
[[10]] 4
[[20]] 7
[[25]] 11
[[32]] 14
[[69]] 21
(b) OPE-table T
〈x, y〉
〈32, 14〉
〈20, 7〉
〈25, 11〉
〈69, 21〉
〈10, 4〉
(c) Data Owner State
Figure 2: Example initialization
is a node in the left subtree L then r  r′ and if r′′ is a node
in the right subtree R, then r  r′′.
Definition IV.4. For a data set D, ENCRYPTOPE generates the
Data Owner state, the set of all 〈xi, yi〉 such that xi ∈ D and
yi is the order of xi. The server state is the pair S = 〈T ,T〉
consisting of the OPE-tree T and the OPE-table T.
Remark IV.5. The reason of using mOPE2.ENCRYPT in
Definition IV.1 instead of mOPE1.ENCRYPT is that the DA
will receive the order part of the ciphertext after the OOPE
protocol. However, by mOPE1.ENCRYPT the binary represent-
ation of this order always reveals the corresponding path in
the tree, allowing the DA to infer more information from the
protocol than required. In contrast, mOPE2 allows the DO to
choose not just the length of the OPE encoding, but also the
order range like 0, . . . ,M . If log2M is larger than the needed
length of the OPE encoding and M is not a power of two,
then for a ciphertext 〈[[x]], y〉 y does not reveal the position
of [[x]] in the tree. In Figure 2a for instance, when applying
mOPE1 with h = 3, the order of 25 (i.e. 011 = 3) reveals
the corresponding path in the tree. However, with mOPE2 and
M = 28, 25 has order 11 = 1011.
Example IV.6. Assume D = {10, 20, 25, 32, 69} is the data
set, M = 28 and the insertion order is 32, 20, 25, 69, 10.
Then the ciphertexts after executing algorithm ENCRYPTOPE
are 〈[[32]], 14〉, 〈[[20]], 7〉, 〈[[25]], 11〉, 〈[[69]], 21〉, 〈[[10]], 4〉. The
OPE-tree, the OPE-table and the DO state are depicted in
Figure 2.
Definition IV.7 (Inputs/Outputs). The Inputs and Outputs of
the oblivious OPE functionality are defined as follow:
• Inputs
– CSP: server’s state S = 〈T ,T〉
– DA : x ∈ P, the input to be encrypted
– DO : sk, DO’s private key under Paillier
• Outputs
– CSP: 〈[[x]], y〉, the ciphertext to update the state
– DA : y ∈ O, the order of x
– DO : ∅, no output.
Definition IV.8 (Correctness). Let D be the data set and the
inputs of the protocol be defined as above. At the end of the
protocol the Data Analyst obtains for its input x the output y
such that y is the order of x in D ∪ {x}. The Cloud Provider
obtains 〈[[x]], y〉 that is added to the OPE-table. The Data
Owner obtains nothing:
OOPE(S, x, sk) = (〈[[x]], y〉 , y, ∅)
DECRYPTOPE(〈[[x]], y〉 , sk) = x
〈[[x1]], y1〉 , 〈[[x2]], y2〉 ∈ T ∧ y1 < y < y2 ⇒ [[x1]]  [[x]]  [[x2]]
Remark IV.9. Updating the server state, i.e.: allowing the
server to learn [[x]], is only necessary if the DA wants to
encrypt several values, as the encryption depends on the state.
We say that two distributions D1 and D2 are computation-
ally indistinguishable (denoted D1 c≡ D1) if no probabilistic
polynomial time algorithm can distinguish them except with
negligible probability. In SMC protocols the view of a party
consists of its input and the sequence of messages that it has
received during the protocol execution [16]. The protocol is
said secure if for each party, one can construct a simulator that
given only the input and the output can generate a distribution
that is computationally indistinguishable to the party’s view.
Definition IV.10 (Semi-honest Security). Let D be the data
set with cardinality n and the inputs and outputs be as
previously defined. Then a protocol Π securely implements
the functionality OOPE in the semi-honest model with honest
majority if the following conditions hold:
• there exists a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm
SDO that simulates the DO’s view viewΠDO of the pro-
tocol given n and the private key sk only,
• there exists a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm
SDA that simulates the DA’s view viewΠDA of the protocol
given n, the input x and the output y only,
• there exists a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm
SCSP that simulates the CSP’s view viewΠCSP of the
protocol given access to the server state S and the output
〈[[x]], y〉 only.
Formally:
SDO(n, sk, ∅) c≡ viewΠDO(S, x, sk) (3)
SDA(n, x, y)
c≡ viewΠDA(S, x, sk) (4)
SCSP (S, 〈[[x]], y〉) c≡ viewΠCSP (S, x, sk) (5)
V. PROTOCOL FOR OBLIVIOUS OPE
In this section we present our scheme ΠOOPE that consists of
an initialization step and a computation step. The initialization
step generates the server state and is run completely by the
Data Owner. The server state and the ciphertexts are sent to
the CSP afterward.
A. Initialization
Let D = {x1, . . . , xn} be the unordered DO’s dataset and
h = log2 n. The DO chooses a range 0, . . . ,M such that
log2M > h (Remark IV.5), runs ENCRYPTOPE from Definition
IV.1 and sends the generated OPE-table to the CSP.
B. Algorithms
In our oblivious OPE protocol the CSP traverses the OPE-
tree (Figure 3). In each step it chooses the next node depending
on a previous oblivious comparison step that involve the DA
and the DO. If the comparison returns equality or the CSP
reaches a null node then it computes the ciphertext based on
the position of the current node in the OPE-table.
In the following we present our main protocol that repeatedly
makes calls to a sub-protocol (Protocol 2). Both protocols run
between the three parties. During the protocol’s execution the
CSP runs Algorithm 3 to traverse the tree and Algorithm 4 to
compute the order.
Our OOPE Protocol. As said before the protocol (Protocol
1) is executed between the three parties. First the CSP retrieves
the root of the tree and sets it as current node. Then the
protocol loops h (= log2 n) times. In each step of the loop the
CSP increments the counter and the parties run an oblivious
comparison protocol (Protocol 2) whose result enables the CSP
to traverse the tree (Algorithm 3). If the inputs are equal or
the next node is empty then the traversal stops. However, the
CSP uses the current node as input to the next comparison
until the counter reaches the value h. After the loop the result
is either the order of the current node in case of equality or it
is computed by the CSP using Algorithm 4. In the last step,
the DA computes [[x]] using DO’s public key pk and sends it
to the CSP as argued in Remark IV.9. Alternatively, the DA
could generate an unique identifier (UID) for each element
that is being inserted and send this UID instead. So if the
corresponding node is later involved in a comparison step, the
result is computed by the DA alone.
Oblivious Comparison Protocol. The oblivious compar-
ison (Protocol 2) is a protocol between the three parties as
well, with input ([[x]], x, sk) for the CSP, the DA and the DO
respectively. First the CSP randomizes its input, with a random
integer r ∈ {0, . . . , 2l+k}6, to [[x + r]] ← [[x]] · [[r]], by first
computing [[r]] with DO’s public key, such that the DO will
not be able to identify the position in the tree, and it sends
[[x+ r]] to the DO and r to the DA. Then the DO with input
(bo, b
′
o, x + r) and the DA with input (ba, b
′
a, x + r) engage
in a garbled circuit protocol for comparison as described in
Section VI. For simplicity, the garbled circuit is implemented
in Protocol 2 as ideal functionality. In reality the DO generates
the garbled circuit and the DA evaluates it. The DA and
the DO receive (be ⊕ ba ⊕ bo, bg ⊕ b′a ⊕ b′o) as output of
this computation and resp. send (ba, b′a, be ⊕ bo, bg ⊕ b′o) and
(bo, b
′
o, be⊕ ba, bg⊕ b′a) to the CSP. Finally the CSP evaluates
6Where k is the security parameter that determines the statistical leakage,
e.g. k = 32 [10].
Figure 3: Overview of the protocol
Protocol 1 Oblivious OPE Protocol
Input (InCSP , InDA, InDO): (S, x, sk)
Output (OutCSP , OutDA, OutDO): (〈[[x]], y〉 , y, ∅)
Functionality : OOPE(S, x, sk)
1: CSP : retrieve root [[xroot]] of T
2: CSP : let [[x]]← [[xroot]]
3: CSP : let count← 0
4: repeat
5: (〈be, bg〉 , ∅, ∅)← COMPARE([[x]], x, sk)
6: CSP : if be 6= 0 then . meaning x 6= x
7: CSP : [[xnext]]← TRAVERSE(bg, [[x]])
8: CSP : if [[xnext]] 6= NIL then
9: CSP : let [[x]]← [[xnext]]
10: CSP : end if
11: CSP : end if
12: CSP : let count← count+ 1
13: until count = h
14: CSP : if be = 0 then . meaning x = x
15: CSP : retrieve 〈[[x]], y〉 and let y ← y
16: CSP : else
17: CSP : y ← ENCRYPT(bg, [[x]])
18: CSP : end if
19: CSP → DA: send y
20: DA → CSP: send [[x]]
Equation 6 and outputs 〈be, bg〉. This will be used to traverse
the OPE-tree.{
be = be ⊕ bo ⊕ bo = be ⊕ ba ⊕ ba
bg = bg ⊕ b′o ⊕ b′o = bg ⊕ b′a ⊕ b′a
(6)
Tree Traversal Algorithm. The tree traversal (Algorithm 3)
Protocol 2 Oblivious Comparison Protocol
Input (InCSP , InDA, InDO): ([[x]], x, sk)
Output (OutCSP , OutDA, OutDO): (〈be, bg〉 , ∅, ∅)
Functionality : COMPARE([[x]], x, sk)
1: CSP: choose an (l+k)-bits random r and compute [[x+r]]
2: CSP → DO: send [[x+ r]]
3: CSP → DA: send r
4: DO: decrypt [[x+ r]] and choose masking bits bo, b′o
5: DA: compute x+ r and choose masking bits ba, b′a
6: DO → GC: send (bo, b′o, x+ r)
7: DA → GC: send (ba, b′a, x+ r)
8: GC ↔ DA: send (be ⊕ ba ⊕ bo, bg ⊕ b′a ⊕ b′o)
9: GC ↔ DO: send (be ⊕ ba ⊕ bo, bg ⊕ b′a ⊕ b′o)
10: DA → CSP: send (ba, b′a, be ⊕ bo, bg ⊕ b′o)
11: DO → CSP: send (bo, b′o, be ⊕ ba, bg ⊕ b′a)
12: CSP: compute be = be ⊕ bo ⊕ bo = be ⊕ ba ⊕ ba
13: CSP: compute bg = bg ⊕ b′o ⊕ b′o = bg ⊕ b′a ⊕ b′a
14: CSP: output 〈be, bg〉
runs only at the CSP. Depending on the output of the oblivious
comparison the CSP either goes to the left (line 2) or to the
the right (line 4). If the comparison step returns equality there
is no need to traverse the current node and the protocol returns
the corresponding ciphertext.
Algorithm 3 Tree Traversal
Input: bg, [[x]]
Output: [[xnext]]
1: function TRAVERSE(bg, [[x]])
2: if bg = 0 then . traverse to left
3: Let [[xnext]] be the left child node of [[x]]
4: else . traverse to right
5: Let [[xnext]] be the right child node of [[x]]
6: end if
7: return [[xnext]]
8: end function
Encryption Algorithm. The encryption algorithm (Al-
gorithm 4) runs at the CSP as well and is called only if the
tree traversal (Algorithm 3) has to stop. Then the compared
values are strictly ordered and depending on that the algorithm
finds the closest element to the current node in the OPE-
table. This element is either the predecessor if DA’s input is
smaller (line 3) or the successor if DA’s input is larger (line
6). Then if necessary (line 10) rebalance the tree and compute
the ciphertext as in line 13.
C. Correctness and Security Proofs
The security of Yao’s protocol is proven in [26] and provides
a simulator, that will be used to construct simulators for DO
and DA.
Algorithm 4 Encryption for value x
1: function ENCRYPT(bg, [[x]])
2: retrieve 〈[[x]], y〉 in the OPE-table
3: if bg = 0 then
4: retrieve predecessor 〈[[x′]], y′〉 of 〈[[x]], y〉
5: let yl ← y′ and yr ← y . y′ < y
6: else
7: retrieve successor 〈[[x′′]], y′′〉 of 〈[[x]], y〉
8: let yl ← y and yr ← y′′ . y < y′′
9: end if
10: if yr − yl = 1 then
11: rebalance the OPE-tree
12: end if
13: y ← yl +
⌈
yr−yl
2
⌉
14: return y
15: end function
Theorem V.1 (Correctness). The protocol ΠOOPE is correct.
Proof. Let bg = (if x > x then 1 else 0) and be = (if x 6=
x then 1 else 0). From inputs (ba, b′a, x+ r) of the DA and
(bo, b
′
o, x+ r) of the DO the garbled circuit returns (be⊕ ba⊕
bo, bg⊕b′a⊕b′o) to the DA and (be⊕ba⊕bo, bg⊕b′a⊕b′o) to the
DO. Then the DA resp. the DO sends (ba, b′a, be⊕ bo, bg⊕ b′o)
resp. (bo, b′o, be⊕ ba, bg⊕ b′a) to the CSP. With Equation 6 the
CSP can correctly deduce be and bg .
Theorem V.2 (Security). The protocol ΠOOPE securely imple-
ments the OOPE functionality in the semi-honest model with
honest majority.
D. Dealing with a malicious activities
As above we assume honest majority. In fact malicious DA
or DO can only cheat in Yao’s protocol or by returning a fake
output of the comparison step to the CSP. Results of the com-
parison step can be checked with Equation 6. For cheating in
Yao’s protocol, there are solutions based on the cut-and-choose
technique that deal with malicious parties [23], [25], [28]. So
in this section we concentrate on the malicious CSP. Recall
that the CSP holds the OPE-table that is a set of ciphertexts
〈[[x]], y〉, where [[x]] is a Paillier ciphertext under public key
pk. Our goal is to prevent a malicious CSP to replace the
〈[[x]], y〉 with self-generated ciphertexts 〈[[x˜]], y˜〉. The solution
consists in computing for each ciphertexts 〈[[x]], y〉 a message
authentication code (MAC) that will constraint the CSP to use
valid [[x]] in the OOPE protocol.
Discrete Logarithm. Our first solution is to use discrete
logarithm. In the initialization step the DO computes for each
node [[x]] a MAC (gx mod p) where g and the prime number
p are unknown to the CSP. Then in each comparison step
the CSP sends [[x + r]] to the DO and (r, gx mod p) to the
DA. The DO reveals g, p and m = (gx+r mod p) to the DA
after decryption. Finally the DA computes (gxgr mod p) =
(gx+r mod p) and checks if it is the same as m. Only if
the check succeeds they engage in the oblivious comparison
protocol. Besides the OOPE protocol the DO can also use
ce,0
cg,0
ce,1
cg,1
...
...
ce,l−1
cg,l−1
⊕
ce,l
cg,l
ce
cg
b′x b
′
x
x1 x1 x0 x0xl−1xl−1bx bx
0
0
Figure 4: Overview of the Garbled Circuit GC=,> for com-
parison and equality test. Each box for i = 0, . . . , l − 1 is
a 1-bit circuit for equality and greater than test and outputs
ce,j+1 = (xj ⊕ xj) ∨ ce,j (Equation 7) and cg,j+1 = (xj ⊕
cg,j)∧ (xj⊕ cg,j)⊕xj (Equation 8) resp.. The last circuit im-
plements exclusive-or operation and outputs ce = ce,l⊕bx⊕bx
and cg = cg,l ⊕ b′x ⊕ b′x.
the discrete logarithm solution to check the integrity of its
database.
Pedersen Commitment. The above solution with discrete
logarithm is not perfectly hiding and only based on the fact that
solving discrete logarithm is computationally difficult. How-
ever if the space of possible value of x is small, anyone
who knows g and p could simply try them all. Hence, this
solution hide x only to the CSP, because the CSP does not
know g and p. However, the solution is vulnerable to the DA.
To perfectly hide x the hiding scheme must be semantically
secure. We therefore propose a solution based on Pedersen
commitment [32]. The DO chooses g and p as above and
another number h and reveals them only to the DA. In the
initialization step the DO stores each node [[x]] with the pair
([[a]], gxha mod p), where a is random. In the first step of the
comparison protocol the CSP chooses two random numbers
r, r′, computes and sends cx = [[x + r]], ca = [[a + r′]] to
the DO. Then the CSP sends (gxha mod p), r and r′ to the
DA. Next the DO decrypts both ciphertexts cx, ca and sends
m = (gx+rha+r
′
mod p) to the DA. Finally the DA computes
m′ = (gxha∗grhr′ mod p) = (gx+rha+r′ mod p) and checks
if m and m′ are equal.
Notice that, a malicious CSP can still corrupt the ho-
momorphic ciphertext in the OPE-table, as homomorphic
encryption is malleable. Additionally, the server may also alter
its responses to the client in an attempt to learn additional
information on top of the order of encrypted values [34]. To
force the server to perform these operations correctly, we can
adapt the idea of [34] that consists of adding Merkle hashing
on top of the OPE-tree and to use it to check the correctness
of the servers responses.
VI. PROTOCOL FOR INTEGER COMPARISON
For our oblivious OPE protocol we needed garbled circuit
for comparison and equality test and adapted the garbled
circuits of [21], [22] to our needs. Firstly, instead of im-
plementing one garbled circuit for comparison and another
one for equality test, we combined both in the same circuit.
This allows to use the advantage that almost the entire cost
of garbled circuit protocols can be shifted into the setup
phase. In Yao’s protocol the setup phase contains all expensive
operations (i.e., computationally expensive OT and creation
of GC, as well as the transfer of GC that dominates the
communication complexity) [21]. Hence, by implementing
both circuits in only one we reduce the two costly setup
phases to one as well. Secondly, in our oblivious OPE protocol,
integer comparison is an intermediate step, hence the output
should not be revealed to the parties participating in the
protocol, since this will leak information. Thus the input of
the circuit contains a masking bit for each party that is used
to mask the actual output. Only the party that receives the
masked output and both masking bits can therefore recover
the actual output. Let GC=,> denote this circuit.
Let P1, P2 be party one and two resp. and let x =
xl−1, . . . , x0, x = xl−1, . . . , x0 be their respective inputs in
binary representation. Parties P1 and P2 choose masking bits
bx, b′x, bx, b
′
x and extend their input to (bx, b
′
x, xl−1, . . . , x0),
(bx, b
′
x, xl−1, . . . , x0) respectively. An overview of the circuit
is illustrated in Figure 4.
For equality test we use Equation7 7. The two first lines
are from [22] and test from 0 to l− 1 if the bits are pairwise
different (i.e their exclusive-or is 1). If not we use the result
of the previous bit test. Initially, this bit is set to 0.
ce,0 = 0
ce,j+1 = (xj ⊕ xj) ∨ ce,j , j = 0, . . . , l − 1
ce = ce,l ⊕ bx ⊕ bx
(7)
The actual output of the circuit ce,l is 1 if x and x are different
and 0 otherwise (i.e. ce,l = [x 6= x]?1 : 0). Then we blind ce,l
by applying exclusive-or operations with the masking bits bx
and bx.
The comparison functionality is defined as (if x > x then
1 else 0) (i.e [x > x]?1 : 0). In [21] the circuit is based on
the fact that [x > x] ⇔ [x− x− 1 ≥ 0] and is summarized
in Equation8 8, where again the two first are from [21]. The
second line represents the 1-bit comparator which depends on
the previous bit comparison. This is initially 0.
cg,0 = 0
cg,j+1 = (xj ⊕ cg,j) ∧ (xj ⊕ cg,j)⊕ xj , j = 0, . . . , l − 1
cg = cg,l ⊕ b′x ⊕ b′x
(8)
Again the actual output cg,l is blinded by applying exclusive-
or operations with the masking bits b′x and b
′
x.
VII. OOPE WITH FREQUENCY-HIDING OPE
In this section we consider the case where the underlying
OPE is not deterministic as in [19]. As above the first step is
the initialization procedure (Section V-A). It remains the same
with the difference that the tree traversal and the encryption
algorithms work as in Kerschbaum’s scheme mOPE3. Hence
if the equality test returns true (line 14 of Protocol 1), the
CSP chooses a random coin and then traverses the tree to the
left or to the right depending on the outcome of the coin.
The order y of x is computed as y = yi−1 + dyi−yi−12 e resp.
7In ce,j and ce, e stands for equality test and j is the bit index
8In cg,j and cg , g stands for greater than and j is as above
y = yi + dyi+1−yi2 e if the algorithm is inserting x left resp.
right to a node [[xi]] with corresponding order yi. However, the
equality test leaks some information, as it allows the CSP to
deduce from the OPE-table that certain nodes have the same
plaintext. Therefore it would be preferable to implement the
random coin in the secure computation.
A. Implementing the random coin in garbled circuit
In the following x and x represent as before the inputs of
the DA and the DO in the oblivious comparison respectively,
and GCu=,> represents the unmasked comparison circuit
9 that
outputs the bits be as result of the equality test and bg as
result of the greater than comparison. The idea is to adapt the
garbled circuit for integer comparison (Section VI) such that
its output allows to traverse the tree randomly as in [19], but
without revealing the result of the equality test to the CSP.
Lemma VII.1. Let rx and rx be some DA’s and DO’s random
bits and br = rx⊕rx. Then extending the circuit GCu=,> to the
circuit GCub with additional input bits rx, rx and with output
b = (be ∧ bg) ∨ (¬be ∧ br) traverses the tree as required.
Proof. If x 6= x then be = 1 and b = bg , hence the algorithm
traverses the tree depending on the greater than comparison.
Otherwise ¬be = 1, hence b is the random bit br and the tree
traversal depends on a random coin. In each case the circuit
returns either 0 or 1, and does not reveal if the inputs are
equal.
Now the circuit GCub can also be extended to the circuit
GCb by using the masking bits ba and bo for the DA and the
DO respectively as described in Section VI. The output is then
((bg ∧ be) ∨ (¬be ∧ br))⊕ ba ⊕ bo.
However, care has to be taken when returning the random
bit. Recall that the protocol loops h times to prevent the DA
and DO from learning the right number of comparisons. Hence
if we reach equality before having performed h comparisons
the garbled circuit computation must keep returning the same
random bit to prevent leaking that information to the CSP.
Therefore DA and DO must keep track on shares of be and br
which are extra inputs to the circuit. Let bˆe, bˆr be the previous
equality bit (initially 1, e.g. 0 for DO and 1 for DA) and
random bit (initially 0), then the garbled circuit must execute
the following procedure: If be = 0 then check if bˆe = 0 and
return bˆr otherwise return br. If be 6= 0 then return bg .
B. Dealing with queries
So far we have computed the ciphertext in the non-
deterministic case. However, as Kerschbaum pointed out [19]
this ciphertext cannot be directly used to query the database.
As in the deterministic case let x and y be symbols for
plaintext and order respectively. Since a plaintext x might
9This is the sub-circuit of Figure 4 that operates on the real input bits (from
0 to l − 1) without the masking bits.
have many ciphertexts let cmin and cmax be respectively the
minimum and maximum order of x, hence:{
cmin(x) = min({y : DECRYPTOPE(〈[[x]], y〉, sk) = x})
cmax(x) = max({y : DECRYPTOPE(〈[[x]], y〉, sk) = x})
(9)
Thus, a query [a, b] must be rewritten in [cmin(a), cmax(b)].
Unfortunately, in Kerschbaum’s scheme the cmin(x), cmax(x)
are only known to the DO, because they reveal to the server
the frequency of plaintexts. Recall that the goal of [19] was
precisely to hide this frequency from the CSP.
Instead of returning y to the DA, which is useless for
queries, our goal is to allow the DA to learn cmin(x) and
cmax(x) and nothing else. The CSP learns only 〈[[x]], y〉 as
before and the DO learns nothing besides the intermediate
messages of the protocol. We begin by proving the following
lemma.
Lemma VII.2. Let yi, yi+1 be the order (i.e. yi < yi+1)
of already encrypted plaintexts xi, xi+1 (i.e. xi ≤ xi+1). Let
x be a new plaintext with corresponding order y such that
xi ≤ x ≤ xi+1. Then it holds: cmin(x) ∈ {cmin(xi), y} and
cmax(x) ∈ {cmax(xi+1), y}.
Proof. If xi = x then by definition of cmin we have
cmin(x) = cmin(xi). If xi < x and x < xi+1 then x occurs
only once in the data set and it holds cmin(x) = cmax(x) = y.
Otherwise x is equal to xi+1, but since x is new and by
assumption x ≤ xi+1 the algorithm is inserting x right to
xi and left to xi+1 hence yi < y < yi+1 must hold. Then by
definition again cmin(x) = y.
For the case of max the proof is similar.
Corollary VII.3. Let x, xi, xi+1, y, yi, yi+1 be as above and
let bi = [xi = x]?1 : 0 resp. bi+1 = [x = xi+1]?1 : 0
then it holds: cmin(x) = bi · cmin(xi) + (1 − bi) · y, resp.
cmax(x) = bi+1 · cmax(xi+1) + (1− bi+1) · y.
Now we are ready to describe the solution. First we assume
that tree rebalancing never happens, because it might update
cmin and cmax for some ciphertexts. The CSP cannot update
cmin and cmax without knowing the frequency. According
to [19] the probability of rebalancing is negligible in n
for uniform inputs if the maximum order M is larger than
26.4·log2 n. For non-uniform input, smaller values of M are
likely.
The first step is to store besides each ciphertext 〈[[x]], y〉
two ciphertexts [[cmin(x)]] and [[cmax(x)]]. This is done by the
DO during the initialization. Let [[x]]DA be a ciphertext of
x encrypted with a Paillier public key, whose corresponding
private key belongs to the DA. After the computation of y
(Protocol 1) the CSP learns 〈[[x]], y〉. Then the parties execute
Protocol 5 with 〈S, 〈[[x]], y〉〉 and sk as input for the CSP and
the DO respectively. The DA does not have any input, but
receives alone the output of the protocol.
Protocol 5 Min Max Order Protocol
Input (InCSP , InDA, InDO): (〈S, 〈[[x]], y〉〉, ∅, sk)
Output (OCSP , ODA, ODO): (∅, 〈cmin(x), cmax(x)〉 , ∅)
Functionality : MINMAXORDER(S, 〈[[x]], y〉, sk)
1: CSP: retrieve 〈[[xi]], yi〉, 〈[[xi+1]], yi+1〉 s.t. yi < y < yi+1
2: CSP: choose random integers s1, s2, r1, r2
3: CSP: compute [[d1]]← [[(xi − x) · s1]]
4: CSP: compute [[d2]]← [[(xi+1 − x) · s2]]
5: CSP → DO: send 〈[[d1]], [[y · r1]]DA, [[cmin(xi) · r1]]〉
6: CSP → DO: send 〈[[d2]], [[y · r2]]DA, [[cmax(xi+1) · r2]]〉
7: CSP → DA: send r1 and r2
8: DO: decrypt [[d1]], [[d2]] and evaluate Equation 10
9: DO → DA: send [[cmin(x) · r1]]DA
10: DO → DA: send [[cmax(x) · r2]]DA
11: DA: decrypt and output cmin(x) and cmax(x)
b1 ← [d1 = 0], b2 ← [d2 = 0]
[[cmin(x) · r1]]DA ← b1?[[cmin(xi) · r1]]DA : [[y · r1]]DA
[[cmax(x) · r2]]DA ← b2?[[cmax(xi+1) · r2]]DA : [[y · r2]]DA
(10)
Notice that for an input x of the DA the ciphertext 〈[[x]], y〉 is
not inserted in the database, but only in the OPE-table, because
it cannot be included in the result of a query. Particularly, if
〈[[x]], y〉 is no longer needed (e.g.: after the data analysis) it
must be removed from the OPE-table. As stated in Lemma
VII.2, if it happens that the new x with corresponding order y
is inserted between xi and xi+1 such that xi < x = xi+1 then
cmin(x) = y implies that the previous cmin(xi+1) should be
updated to y. However, as explained before this update is not
necessary.
In Protocol 5 the DO sees two semantically secure cipher-
texts [[y · r1]]DA and [[y · r2]]DA, which it cannot decrypt, and
four randomized plaintexts d1, cmin(xi) · r1, d2, cmax(xi+1) ·
r2. The DA sees two random integers r1, r2 and the output
of the protocol. The CSP receives no new message. Hence
simulating the protocol is straightforward.
VIII. IMPLEMENTATION
We have implemented our scheme using SCAPI (Secure
Computation API)[13]. SCAPI is an open-source Java library
for implementing secure two-party and multiparty computation
protocols. It provides a reliable, efficient, and highly flexible
cryptographic infrastructure. It also provides many optimiza-
tions of garbled circuits construction such as OT extensions,
free-XOR, garbled row reduction [13]. Furthermore, there is
a built-in communication layer that provides communication
services for any interactive cryptographic protocol. This layer
is comprised of two basic communication types: a two-party
communication channel and a multiparty layer that arranges
communication between multiple parties.
A. Parameters
The first parameter that should be defined for the experiment
is the security parameter (i.e. bit length of the public key)
of Paillier’s scheme (e.g. 2048 or 4096). Paillier’s scheme
requires to choose two large prime numbers P and Q of equal
length and to compute a modulus N = PQ and the private
key λ = lcm(P − 1, Q − 1). Then select a random g ∈ Z∗N2
such that if e is the smallest integer with ge = 1 mod N2, then
N divides e. The public key is (g,N). To encrypt a plaintext
m select a random r ∈ Z∗N and compute Equation 11. To
decrypt a ciphertext c compute Equation 12 with L(u) = u−1N
and µ = (L(gλ mod N2))−1 mod N .
c ← gmrN mod N2 (11)
m ← L(cλ mod N2) · µ mod N (12)
The other parameters of the OOPE protocol are the length
of the inputs (e.g. 32, 64, 128, 256 bits integer), the length of
the order log2M - with M the maximal order - (e.g. 32, 64,
128 bits), and the size of the database (e.g. 103, 104, 105, 106
entries).
B. Optimization
To reduce the execution cost of our scheme we applied
optimizations of Paillier’s scheme as recommended in [31].
We implemented our scheme with g = 1+N . This transforms
the modular exponentiation gm mod N2 to a multiplication,
since (1 +N)m mod N2 = 1 +mN mod N2. Moreover, we
precomputed µ in Equation 12, used Chinese remaindering
for decryption and pre-generated randomness for encryption
and homomorphic plaintext randomization (Protocol 2). As a
result, encryption, decryption and homomorphic addition take
respectively 52µs, 12ms and 67µs when the key length is
2048 bits.
C. Evaluation
To evaluate the performance of our scheme we answer the
following questions:
• What time does the scheme take to encrypt an input of
the DA?
• How does the network communication influence the
protocol?
• What is the average generation time and the storage cost
of the OPE-tree?
Experimental Setup. We chose 2048 bits as security para-
meter for Paillier’s scheme and ran experiments via loopback
address and via LAN using 3 machines with Intel(R) Xeon(R)
CPU E7-4880 v2 at 2.50GHz. For the LAN experiment, the
first machine with 4 CPUs and 8 GB RAM ran the CSP, the
second machine with 4 CPUs and 4 GB RAM ran the DO and
the last machine with 2 CPUs and 2 GB RAM ran the DA.
For the loopback experiment we used the first machine.
We generated the OPE-tree with random inputs, balanced it
and encrypted the plaintexts with Paillier encryption. For the
DA, we generated 100 random inputs. Then we executed the
OOPE protocol 100 times and computed the average time
spent in the overall protocol, in the oblivious comparison, in
Yao’s protocol, in Paillier’s decryption.
Encryption Cost. Figure 5 shows the average cost (y-axis)
needed to encrypt a value with the OOPE protocol for database
Figure 5: Encryption Cost of OOPE
(a) Via Loopback
(b) Via LAN
Figure 6: Cost of oblivious comparison
sizes (x-axis) between 100 and 1,000,000. Overall, the cost for
OOPE goes up as the size of the database increases. This is
because the depth of the tree increases with its size. Hence,
this implies larger number of oblivious comparisons for larger
trees. The average encryption time of OOPE for a database
with one million entries is about 0.3 s via loopback (1.3 s
via LAN). This cost corresponds to the cost of comparison
multiply by the number of comparisons (e.g. 20 comparisons
for 1000000 entries).
The inherent sub-protocol for oblivious comparison does not
depend on the database size but on the input length and the
security parameter log2N . Figure 6 shows that this cost is
almost constant for each database size. Via loopback (Figure
6a) the comparison costs about 14 ms which is dominated by
the time (about 12 ms to the DO) to decrypt [[x+r]] in step 4 of
Protocol 2. The remaining 2 ms are due to the garbled circuit
execution, since the overhead due to network communication
(a) Average generation time
(b) Storage cost for log2N = 2048
Figure 7: OPE-tree costs
is negligible. Figure 6b shows how the network communica-
tion affects the protocol. Via LAN (Figure 6b) the comparison
costs about 60 ms where the computation is still dominated by
the 12 ms for decryption. However, the network traffic causes
an overhead of about 46 ms.
OPE-tree costs. The time to generate the OPE-tree also
increases with the number of entries in the database and it
is dominated by the time needed to encrypt the input data
with Paillier’s scheme. However, the above optimizations (i.e.
choice of g = 1 + N and pre-generated randomness) enable
a fast generation of the OPE-tree. Figure 7a illustrates the
generation time on the y-axis for databases with size between
100 and 1,000,000 on the x-axis. For 1 million entries, the
generation costs on average only about 4.5 seconds.
The storage cost of the tree depends on log2N , the bit length
of the order and the database size. Since Paillier ciphertexts
are twice longer than log2N , each OPE ciphertext 〈[[x]], y〉
needs 2 · log2N + log2M bits storage. This is illustrated in
Figure 7b, with the x-axis representing the database size. The
scheme needs 492.1 MB to store 1 million OPE ciphertexts,
when the security parameter is 2048 and the order is 32-bit
long.
IX. CONCLUSION
Since order-preserving encryption (OPE) schemes are lim-
ited to the use case to one server and one client, we intro-
duced a novel notion of oblivious order-preserving encryption
(OOPE) as an equivalent of a public-key order-preserving
encryption. Then we presented a protocol for OOPE that
combines deterministic OPE schemes based on binary tree
search with Paillier’s homomorphic encryption scheme and
garbled circuits. We also applied our technique to the case
where the underlying OPE scheme is probabilistic. Finally,
we implemented our scheme with SCAPI and an optimized
Paillier’s scheme and showed that it achieves acceptable per-
formance for interactive use.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem V.2
Theorem V.2 (Security). The protocol ΠOOPE securely imple-
ments the OOPE functionality in the semi-honest model with
honest majority.
Proof. Since the protocol makes a call to the comparison
functionality involving the DO and the DA, the proof will
use the simulators of Theorem 7 of [26] to generate the view
of the Data Owner and the Data Analyst. Let SCO1 and S
CO
2
be respectively the simulators of the DO and the DA in the
comparison protocol. We follow the idea of [26] by proving
the cases separately, when the DO is corrupted, when the DA
is corrupted and when the CSP is corrupted. Let CO denote
the comparison functionality of the garbled circuit protocol,
in which the DO and the DA are respectively generator and
evaluator, then the view of DA and DO in the comparison
protocol are denoted by viewΠCODA and view
ΠCO
DO respectively.
Case 1 - DO is corrupted
The view of the Data Owner consists of a sequence of
randomized inputs and its view in the comparison steps needed
to compute the output. Let l be the number of comparisons
required to encrypt x, then viewΠOOPEDO (S, x, sk) contains:
[[x(i) + r(i)]], x(i) + r(i), b(i)o , b
′(i)
o ,
viewΠCODO (〈b(i)o , b
′(i)
o , x
(i) + r(i)〉, 〈b(i)a , b
′(i)
a , x
(i) + r(i)〉),
〈b(i)e ⊕ b(i)a ⊕ b(i)o , b(i)g ⊕ b
′(i)
a ⊕ b
′(i)
o 〉, 〈b(i)e ⊕ b(i)a , b(i)g ⊕ b
′(i)
a 〉
(13)
for i = 1 · · · l. Notice that, in contradiction to a normal
comparison protocol, neither the real input nor the real output
are revealed to the DO. They are completely random to the
DO. The input is randomized by the CSP and the output
is randomly blinded by the DA. Upon input (sk, ∅) SDO
generates for each i = 1 · · · l the following:
[[x
′(i)]], x
′(i), b(i), b
′(i),
SCO1 (〈b(i), b
′(i), x
′(i)〉, 〈b(i)1 ⊕ b(i), b(i)2 ⊕ b
′(i)〉),
〈b(i)1 ⊕ b(i), b(i)2 ⊕ b
′(i)〉, 〈b(i)1 , b(i)2 〉 (14)
where x
′(i) is a random integer and b(i), b
′(i), b
(i)
1 , b
(i)
2 are
random bits. Clearly the outputs of Equation 13 and Equation
14 are indistinguishable from each other (Equation 3).
This is because x(i) + r(i), b(i)o , b
′(i)
o are just as random as
x
′(i), b(i), b
′(i) respectively. Furthermore, since b(i)a and b
′(i)
a
are randomly chosen by the DA, b(i)e ⊕ b(i)a , b(i)g ⊕ b
′(i)
a are
also just as random as b(i)1 , b
(i)
2 respectively. The security of
Yao’s protocol (Theorem 7 of [26]) finishes the proof.
Case 2 - DA is corrupted
This case is similar to the DO’s case with the only difference
that the DA knows x which is the same in each protocol round.
The view viewΠOOPEDA (S, x, sk) contains:
r(i), x+ r(i), b(i)a , b
′(i)
a ,
viewΠCODA (〈b(i)o , b
′(i)
o , x
(i) + r(i)〉, 〈b(i)a , b
′(i)
a , x+ r
(i)〉),
〈b(i)e ⊕ b(i)a ⊕ b(i)o , b(i)g ⊕ b
′(i)
a ⊕ b
′(i)
o 〉, 〈b(i)e ⊕ b(i)o , b(i)g ⊕ b
′(i)
o 〉
(15)
for i = 1 · · · l. Notice that also the DA is unaware of the result
of the comparison, because the output is randomized by a bit
of the DO. The simulator for the DA works in the same way
as SDO. On input (x, y) SDA generates for each i = 1 · · · l
the following:
r
′(i), x+ r
′(i), b(i), b
′(i),
SCO2 (〈b(i), b
′(i), x+ r(i)〉, 〈b(i)1 ⊕ b(i), b(i)2 ⊕ b
′(i)〉),
〈b(i)1 ⊕ b(i), b(i)2 ⊕ b
′(i)〉, 〈b(i)1 , b(i)2 〉 (16)
where b(i), b
′(i), b
(i)
1 , b
(i)
2 are random bits.
Case 3 - CSP is corrupted
The view viewΠOOPECSP (S, x, sk) of the CSP consists of random
integers and outputs of the garbled circuit, that it receives from
the DA and the DO:
[[x(i)]], r(i), [[x(i) + r(i)]], 〈b(i)a , b
′(i)
a , b
(i)
e ⊕ b(i)o , b(i)g ⊕ b
′(i)
o 〉,
〈b(i)o , b
′(i)
o , b
(i)
e ⊕ b(i)a , b(i)g ⊕ b
′(i)
a 〉. (17)
SCSP is given the server state S and a valid ciphertext 〈[[x]], y〉.
Then it chooses two elements 〈[[xi]], yj〉, 〈[[xj+1]], yj+1〉 from
the OPE-table, such that yj ≤ y < yj+1. The next step is to
insert [[x]] in the tree and simulate the path from the root to
[[x]]. There are three possible cases:
• if y1 = y then [[x]] is the same as [[xj ]]
• else if depth([[yj ]]) > depth([[yj+1]]) then insert [[x]] right
to [[xj ]]
• else depth([[xj+1]]) > depth([[xj ]]), insert [[x]] left to
[[xj+1]]
where depth([[x]]) represents the depth of the node [[x]], i.e.
the number of edges from the root node of the tree to [[x]]. For
all ancestors of [[x]], b(i)g is 0 (resp. 1) if the path P goes to the
left (resp. to the right). The value of b(i)e is 1 for all ancestors
of [[x]]. For the node [[x]] itself, there are two possible cases:
• [[x]] is not a leaf: this occurs if one is trying to insert a
value, that was already in the tree. It holds b(i)g = b
(i)
e = 0
because yi is equal to y.
• [[x]] is a leaf: this occurs either because [[x]] is inserted
at a leaf node or yi = y holds as in the first case. For
the former case b(i)g and b
(i)
e are undefined because no
comparison was done. For the latter one b(i)e is 0 which
also implies b(i)g = 0. Hence the simulator chooses b
(i)
g =
b
(i)
e randomly between 0 and undefined.
To simulate the CSP’s view, SCSP chooses a random integer
r
′(i) and random bits b(i)α , b
′(i)
α and b
(i)
ω , b
′(i)
ω and outputs
[[x(i)]], r
′(i), [[x(i) + r
′(i)]], 〈b(i)α , b
′(i)
α , b
(i)
e ⊕ b(i)ω , b(i)g ⊕ b
′(i)
ω 〉,
〈b(i)ω , b
′(i)
ω , b
(i)
e ⊕ b(i)α , b(i)g ⊕ b
′(i)
α 〉. (18)
Since [[x(i)]], b(i)e , b
(i)
g depend on the path they are the same in
Equation 17 and Equantion 18 and r(i), b(i)a , b
′(i)
a , b
(i)
o , b
′(i)
o are
indistinguishable from r
′(i), b
(i)
α , b
′(i)
α , b
(i)
ω , b
′(i)
ω .
